The Court of Appeal has overturned Sheldon J’s decision in Mazur, confirming that an unauthorised person may carry out tasks that amount to the conduct of litigation, provided they do so under the supervision and direction of an authorised lawyer. A copy of the judgment is below (with thanks to the Law Society Gazette).

Background to the Appeal

Sir Colin Birss, Chancellor of the High Court, delivering the unanimous judgment, held that an unauthorised person “is not limited merely to assisting or supporting an authorised individual”. The distinction drawn below—between (a) supporting or assisting and (b) conducting litigation under supervision—was incorrect. What matters is that the authorised person has in place “appropriate arrangements for the supervision of and delegation to the unauthorised person”.

Core Principles Confirmed by the Court of Appeal

The Court set out several important principles:

1. Distinction Between Litigants in Person and Authorised Individuals

A litigant in person may conduct their own case but cannot delegate litigation tasks.
An authorised person, however, may delegate tasks to an unauthorised individual, provided they retain responsibility (para 25).

2. Delegation Requires Proper Supervision

The nature and extent of supervision is a regulatory question. The authorised person remains accountable (para 26).

3. Assistance vs Conduct of Litigation

The Court rejected the argument that “assistance/support” is fundamentally different from “conduct of litigation under supervision” (para 27).

4. Clarification of Baxter v Doble

The Court noted that Baxter v Doble is frequently misunderstood. It concerned a litigant in person and did not expand the statutory definition of litigation conduct (para 28).

5. No Exhaustive List of Litigation Tasks

The Court reaffirmed that no comprehensive definition is possible; assessments depend on fact and degree (para 29).

Delegation and the Legal Services Act 2007

The Court accepted CILEX’s central argument that, prior to the Legal Services Act 2007, there was a widespread and well regulated practice of solicitors delegating litigation work to unqualified staff. The Act did not intend to alter this. Delegation never absolved solicitors of their professional responsibilities, nor undermined their duties to clients or the court.

Sir Colin observed that Parliament must have understood that this practice existed and that solicitors were already regulated in respect of it. Where delegation occurred, the solicitor remained professionally accountable, with regulatory frameworks addressing supervision in detail.

What It Means to “Carry On the Conduct of Litigation”

The Court drew a critical distinction:

• “Conduct of litigation” refers to the tasks themselves.
• “Carry on” refers to direction, control, and responsibility for those tasks.

Therefore:

• An unauthorised person may lawfully perform any task within the scope of the conduct of litigation, so long as it is for and on behalf of an authorised solicitor or CILEX lawyer.
• The authorised person remains responsible and is therefore the person “carrying on” the conduct of litigation.
• The unauthorised person, in those circumstances, does not commit an offence.
• Proper management, supervision and control are required, but not the level of prior approval suggested by the Law Society and SRA.

Supervision requirements will vary: some situations may require close oversight, while in routine matters regular meetings and sampling of work may suffice.

Tasks Unlikely to Constitute the Conduct of Litigation

Although an exhaustive list is impossible, the Court identified several tasks that are unlikely to fall within the statutory definition, including:

• pre action work,
• legal advice relating to proceedings,
• correspondence with opponents,
• evidence-gathering,
• instructing experts and counsel,
• signing a statement of truth for a statement of case,
• signing documents that the CPR permits a legal representative to sign.

Additional Judicial Commentary

Birss LJ’s summary at paragraph 187 is notably clear and well expressed. Andrews LJ distilled the judgment succinctly, emphasising that the key question is whether the unauthorised person is genuinely acting on behalf of the authorised individual. If so, the authorised individual is conducting the litigation; if not, the unauthorised person would be committing an offence.
The Court noted it had the benefit of fuller argument than the courts below. While the appeal was allowed, Sir Colin accepted that Sheldon J’s conclusion was understandable given the limited assistance he received at the time.

Practical Implications for Law Firms

This decision will provide considerable relief to many in the profession who have been operating under uncertainty—and in some cases anxiety—about whether routine delegation could constitute a criminal offence. It brings welcome clarity, though the Ndole “fact and degree” test means that case-by-case assessments remain necessary.

There is also a broader regulatory question: how firms, particularly those with paralegal heavy models, will demonstrate adequate supervision in practice and whether this may influence insurance considerations. This will be an important area to watch.

About the author

Estella Newbold-Brown is Partner and Head of Family, advising high-net-worth clients on complex financial settlements and children matters.

Estella is a highly regarded family law specialist, advising high-net-worth individuals on complex financial and children-related matters. She acts in cases involving significant wealth, family businesses, international assets, and offshore structures, and is known for her strategic, pragmatic, and empathetic approach. She is recognised for her meticulous organisation, clear communication and forward-thinking style, ensuring clients feel supported throughout every stage of their case.